Introduction
Anti-social behaviour (ASB) policy in England and Wales 1 has rapidly evolved since it was first introduced in 1998. The objective of this article is to critically analyse the interpretation and potentially far-reaching consequences of one of the main policy developments enacted by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government through the Anti-Social
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014), namely Public Spaces Protection Orders (PSPOs).
Created as part of the drive to 'put victims first' (see Heap, 2014; Duggan and Heap, 2014; Heap, 2016) , part four of the Act affords local councils flexible powers to combat ASB in public places, which negatively affects the quality of life. Adopting a quality of life classification 2 moves away from the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) definition of ASB, which is underpinned by notions of harassment, alarm or distress. Lowering the threshold for the point at which behaviour 'becomes' ASB broadens the range of behaviours that can be considered anti-social, resulting in a greater spectrum of behaviour that can be sanctioned.
Controlled and initiated by local councils, PSPOs can prohibit specific behaviours from being undertaken or require specific behaviours to be undertaken in a particular space, or do both of these things (Home Office, 2014) . Essentially, PSPOs are a spatial version of anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) as they create a unique penal code for the designated area;
however their powers control the behaviour of anyone using that space not just those deemed 'anti-social'. The new policy broadens the Dispersal Order power created by the Anti-Social Behaviour Act (2003) , where groups of two or more people could be dispersed from a designated zone, or the police could return any unaccompanied young person under the age of 16 to their home address between 9pm and 6am. PSPOs also extend and replace other powers such as Dog Control Orders, Gating Orders and the Designated Public Place
Orders (which restrict alcohol consumption). The extent of behaviours restricted by PSPOs is unlimited so long as: the behaviour has a detrimental effect on the quality of life, is 3 persistent, unreasonable, and justifies the restrictions imposed (Home Office, 2014) .
Consequently, like much previous ASB legislation, PSPOs can prohibit non-criminal behaviours that are criminalised upon breach of the order. Individuals that do not comply with a PSPO can receive a fixed penalty notice (FPN) of up to £100 or a fine not exceeding £1000 on summary conviction. PSPOs can be created without being initiated by a public complaint, but the local council must consult with the police and whatever community representatives they deem appropriate (Home Office, 2014).
To appraise PSPOs this article will engage with, and extend, Bannister and O'Sullivan's (2013) discussion of civility, community cohesion and ASB policy. They consider the extent to which community cohesion and ASB policies support an improvement in the quality of community relations, using civility as an analytical framework. By examining PSPOs through a critical criminological lens, we develop their propositions that ASB policy is: constructed on sparse evidence, not aimed at creating social harmony, and based on reinforcing an inequality of status. To achieve this, two core topics will be discussed. Firstly, we will analyse and question the regulatory and enforcement challenges associated with the implementation of PSPOs in practice. Secondly, as these practical concerns do not operate in a vacuum, we consider that PSPO legislation has the capacity to influence behavioural tolerance thresholds, which have the potential to create and promote new local civility agendas.
PSPOs in Practice
The Home Office introduced new ASB powers in 2014 as part of the programme of measures to make ASB policy more victim-focused (Home Office, 2012) . This marked a clear change in emphasis from previous perpetrator-focused New Labour ASB policies that espoused the importance of rights and responsibilities (Home Office, 2003) and respect (Respect Taskforce, 2006a; 2006b) , demonstrating the politically-driven nature of ASB policy (Garrett, 2007; Heap, 2016) Bannister and O'Sullivan (2013: 95) note the overarching rhetoric of civility contained in these policies, with their definition of civility being 'a code of superficial behaviours necessary to enable diverse populations to coexist in harmony'
[original emphasis]. However, the explicit focus on perpetrators of ASB ultimately resulted in creating division in communities by highlighting a virtuous 'us' and anti-social 'them' 4 (Millie, 2009 dogs to foul and failing to remove the waste, and allowing dogs to enter covered public space (Oxford City Council, 2015a) . Several of these prohibitions target the behaviours associated with street sleeping homeless people.
This is a notable shift in ASB policy in several ways. Firstly, pre-existing spatial ASB powers, such as dispersal orders, have traditionally targeted behaviours associated with young people (Smithson, 2005) . Secondly, street sleeping homelessness does not, per se, constitute ASB. Thirdly, it supports our suggestion that PSPOs have the potential to create new frontiers in exclusion, intolerance and criminalisation. The fact that this vulnerable and marginalised group now appears to be subject to greater behavioural scrutiny and support services and charities not having the capacity to cope with the rising numbers, and a higher incidence of rough sleepers from Central and Eastern Europe.
The commitment to financial austerity policies, which have been embraced by both the Coalition and Conservative governments, has had a major impact on public spending.
Outside of protected budgets (e.g. for education, healthcare and overseas aid), public worse (Guardian, 2017) . A greater number of people sleeping on the streets increases the potential for ASB to be perceived by other people using that space, and the PSPO prohibitions that have been enacted suggest this is the case. It is worth considering that the dynamics of the situation could be reciprocal here. The application of PSPOs to street sleepers may also consolidate and validate any pre-existing negative sentiments among members of the public, or might lead to a reframing of public perceptions from empathy towards seeing these people as a problem. Shaping PSPOs to prohibit common behaviours undertaken by street sleeping homeless people is a marked shift from previous socio-spatial ASB powers, such as Dispersal Orders, which chiefly affected young people (Bannister and O'Sullivan, 2013; Bannister and Kearns, 2013a) . However, it is as equally problematic as we shall go on to discuss.
Overall, the examples outlined above display the vast breadth of behaviours currently prohibited in certain public spaces by PSPOs throughout England and Wales. Creating prohibitions based on anything that negatively affects the quality of life, means that an unlimited range of behaviours can be incorporated as part of a PSPO. This demonstrates that civility is being re-shaped, by decreasing the tolerance of what is considered acceptable behaviour in public spaces.
Enforcement
PSPOs can be enforced by police officers, police community support officers and council officers (including individuals they designate powers to), with fixed penalty notices (FPNs) of 7 up to £100 (Home Office, 2014). FPNs have traditionally been associated with local councils, as they deal with environmental offences such as littering and fly-posting (GOV.UK, 2016a).
They were not created to sanction nuisance or disorderly behaviour, which has been the remit of Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs), issued by the police since the Criminal Justice and Police Act (2001), for offences such as drunk and disorderly behaviour in a public place.
Superficially, there appears to only be semantic differences between FPNs and PNDs, until the guidance for each power is scrutinised in relation to the types of requirements included in PSPOs. Ministry of Justice (2014) Office, 2014: 51) . If prosecuted, the fine can rise to up to £1000, which for a street sleeping homeless person makes it even less likely that they will stop being homeless, the behaviour that created this situation in the first instance.
GOV.UK (2016a) provides guidance on how councils must use the income generated from When considering breaches and FPN income, not all PSPO violations will be sanctioned anyway, due to the vast number of behaviours that could be included in the PSPO and the geographical area they cover. For example, enforcement officers will not witness every occurrence of foul or abusive language. ASBOs were similarly unenforceable at all times due to the range of individual prohibitions (Matthews et al., 2007) . The consequence is that the behaviour the PSPO intends to prohibit remains. Furthermore, it may also prompt spatial displacement, a phenomenon that was also associated with another PSPO predecessor, the dispersal order (Crawford and Lister, 2007) . The wording of PSPOs has already been highlighted as an issue by O'Brien (2016) who explains the difficulties associated with enforcing PSPOs due to the vague wording of some of their prohibitions, for instance using the word request instead of require, resulting in enforcement officers being unable to impose compliance. Overall, enforcing PSPOs is fraught with difficulties and inconsistencies that make their use unfair and particularly damaging, and even criminalising, for certain types of people.
Regulation
PSPOs have been particularly criticised for providing unelected local council officers with law-creation powers that are subject to 'minimal checks and balances and a very low burden of proof' (The Manifesto Club, 2016). Consequently, anti-PSPO campaigns and petitions, by groups such as Liberty and The Manifesto Club, have led to local councils retreating on initial plans to prohibit rough sleeping and busking in public spaces, such as in Chester (BBC News, 2016) and Hackney (Liberty, 2016b given the nature of those enacted so far, there is a complete lack of scrutiny of all the new powers introduced in 2014. Furthermore, they also confirmed that 'the Home Office has not required the police or other local agencies to report on the use of these powers. We did not want to burden frontline practitioners with data requests to require them to tell central Programme. This flagship ASB intervention, which cost £1billion, did not make 'any systemic or significant improvements in families' outcomes' (Day et al., 2016: 54) . Overall, there appears to be no mechanism (or impetus) to compare how different areas are operationalising PSPO powers, which is likely to lead to a postcode lottery for victims dependent on where they live (similar to the Community Trigger powers, discussed elsewhere (Heap, 2016) that affects the quality of life, the government has further extended Cohen's (1979) conception of 'thinning the mesh' and 'widening the net' of unacceptability. This net was already cast wide, with Burney (2009) conformity. When contemplating issues of behavioural tolerance, it is important to consider the location where the behaviour takes place. Bannister and Kearns (2009: 182) suggest that 'our thresholds of tolerance are spatially specific and spatially variant'. Consequently, certain behaviours may be tolerated in a commercial urban setting that would not be tolerated in a residential area. This is an important factor when considering public spaces and the types of prohibitions evident in PSPOs because of the localised nature of their remit. O'Sullivan (2013: 2014) suggest that ASB policy at a national level 'has cast the government and its agencies in the roles of bulwark for the protection and defence of aggrieved groups'. However, through PSPO legislation, local councils now have unprecedented control to set local civility agendas which signifies Conservative-driven localism and deflects central governmental responsibility (Featherstone et al., 2012) . Local councils have had the opportunity to create local byelaws, which have the power to outlaw specific behaviour within a specified location, since the Local Government Act 1972.
However, these cannot be implemented where alternative legislation already exists I do not want them getting drunk, acting in foul ways putting people off our town.
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Humphreys was talking about proposals for a PSPO which included a condition to prohibit begging. It reflects current public hostilities towards populations considered to be a burden on the public purse, such as the unemployed, welfare recipients and irregular migrants (Tyler, 2013) . It is evident that many existing PSPO prohibitions focus on the regulation, and consequent criminalisation, of street sleeping homeless people through prohibitions relating to begging and rough sleeping (e.g. remaining in a public toilet without a reasonable excuse).
Allied to Humphreys' statement, it is clear that street sleeping homeless people, who previously provoked public sympathy and assistance (Ravenhill, 2016) , are now treated with disdain; be that by the public who make complaints, local councils who create targeted PSPOs or both. The appetite to sanction behaviours such as begging and homelessness mirrors other elements of government rhetoric from 2010 to the present day, which appear to further exclude ostracised populations. For example, the politics of the socially marginalised have focused on the deservedness of welfare claims in the context of austerity and public sector funding cuts, as epitomised by the 'striver versus skiver' rhetoric (Valentine and Harris, 2014) , which champions 'hard-working families' (Guardian, 2013; Cameron, 2014) . Similarly, PSPOs focus on the deservedness of people to use public spaces and provide the opportunity to cleanse spaces of those who do not conform to social or spatial norms. What the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014) has done therefore, is give the power to define deservedness to local council officers who can set local thresholds of tolerance around particular behaviours. Consequently, if a local council perceives there is a specific problem with street sleeping homeless people in their area (or any other behaviour for that matter), they have the powers to increasingly lower the tolerance levels towards that behaviour and create local civility agendas; essentially problematising difference (Bannister and Kearns, 2013b ).
Bannister and Kearns (2009) point out that by increasingly sanctioning lower threshold behaviours, tolerance levels are likely to decrease further by eliminating opportunities to interact with others that can build common trust and values, which creates something of a vicious circle. These substantial powers are held by local council officers, not necessarily elected officials. There is a duty on local councils to consult with the police and 'whatever community representatives they think appropriate ' (Home Office, 2014: 48) . However published consultations show online surveys have been used (Oxford City Council, 2015b), 12 which the people targeted by the PSPO (e.g. street sleeping homeless people) are exceptionally unlikely to know about or be able to access in order to represent their views. This is hugely problematic because it undermines local democracy and can have substantial and far-reaching negative consequences for those affected by the prohibitions.
Like so many deliberations about ASB, discussions inevitably return to the definitional issues associated with reporting and recording incidents (Whitehead et al., 2003; Millie et al., 2005; Heap, 2009) . When considering tolerance levels and PSPO conditions, it is salient to think about the types of complaints that might prompt the prohibitions. The quality of life threshold is in place to ensure victims are put first (Home Office, 2014) . However, it is perhaps quite unlikely that a victim will make a report to the police/local council based on a behaviour negatively impacting on their quality of life, which will subsequently require a judgement by the call-handler to determine the extent of the impact on the quality of life.
We already know that police call-handling practices related to ASB are inconsistent (HMIC 2010; HMIC, 2012) , and there is evidence the public are sometimes unclear what ASB entails, even in relation to the harassment, alarm or distress definition (Heap, 2010) . Therefore, how local councils interpret the behaviour that has been reported is likely to have a significant impact on the types of behaviours that are put forward for prohibition in a PSPO.
The Home Office guidance document suggests that witness statements are important here too (Home Office, 2014) , however this relies upon a complaint being made in the first instance. Unfortunately, openly available police statistics from the online portal police.uk only show that an incident of ASB has occurred; therefore, it is unclear if PSPOs that prohibit specific behaviours are the direct result of multiple reports about that issue. Nevertheless, by making a judgement about what prohibitions to include in a PSPO, local councils decide whose quality of life is prioritised. In the case of street sleeping homeless people, this can result in them obtaining a criminal conviction for a non-criminal act, in order to, as the Home Office (2014: 49) put it 'make public spaces more welcoming to the majority of law abiding people and communities'. Fitzpatrick and Jones (2005: 397) , when discussing homelessness and social justice, make the salient point that 'any policies which have a major, negative impact on the lives of an acutely disadvantaged group cannot be justified by reference to a marginal gain for a (on the whole) less disadvantaged group'. Therefore, local councils that justify prohibiting behaviours associated with street sleeping homelessness 13 through PSPOs are excluding and potentially criminalising some of the most vulnerable people in their community by creating new civility agendas to appease and prioritise the experiences of those in least need, which further decreases tolerance levels.
The other way local councils appear to be interpreting PSPOs, is as a mechanism to 'solve' long-standing and/or difficult problems (by providing a short-term fix), which includes prohibiting behaviours such as skateboarding and commercial dog-walking (Kettering Borough Council, 2016 and Oxford City Council, 2015a respectively), as well as street sleeping homelessness and begging. This may be due to the burden of public spending cuts, pressure from the public to secure quick results and local councillors' concerns about their prospect of re-election. Whether based on public reports or part of a strategic problemsolving solution, local councils will need to carefully manage their use of PSPOs to avoid creating unrealistic public expectations of their utility. By using PSPO powers as a quick-fix, local councils are unlikely to be solving the problems they face, with spatial displacement and additional public complaints the most likely outcomes. Local councils are faced with the difficult challenge of balancing victims' and the public's needs, with those of the perpetrator(s). PSPOs do not provide a suitable long-term solution for many of the behaviours prohibited. Greater work needs to be undertaken to build tolerance within and between communities to foster better community relations, what Bannister and Kearns (2013b) term 'engagement', rather than dividing communities with decreasing tolerance levels and locally defined civility agendas that exclude some of the most vulnerable members of the community. Enabling different groups to engage with each other may help to prevent hostility, thus reducing the need for ASB powers to be employed.
Conclusion
Changes made to ASB policy in England and Wales by the ASB, Crime and Policing Act (2014) were intended to create more flexible powers to tackle disorderly behaviour. By examining the far-reaching capabilities of PSPOs, this article has suggested that these developments have created a tool whereby local councils have the potential to exclude and criminalise vulnerable groups from public spaces; based on decreasing tolerance levels towards difference and hardening perceptions of deservedness. We have demonstrated how Bannister and O'Sullivan's (2013) conceptions of civility and ASB policy have evolved 14 following the introduction of the new legislation, by suggesting how civility is now increasingly conceptualised and enforced at a local level, without scrutiny.
Numerous issues with the interpretation of PSPOs have been exposed, particularly around enforcement. More ominously, information provided by the Home Office has shown a wholesale lack of regulation of the new powers. This is problematic because there is no data available to monitor the effectiveness of PSPOs, so it is unclear if, and how, such powers will assist victims of ASB; the reason why the legislation was introduced in the first place.
Furthermore, the lack of scrutiny over the types of prohibitions being imposed, gives local councils free reign to set new local civility agendas that, at present, appear to be targeting, amongst others, the behaviours associated with street sleeping homeless people. In such a contested terrain as public space, it is difficult to balance the needs of victims, the public, and the 'perpetrator'. Local councils and other stakeholders faced with this challenge experience conflict when creating a PSPO and, due to the financial pressures of austerity on wider public services, are likely not to please everyone.
As a result of these issues, a range of empirical research is required to better understand: i) How local councils navigate the decision-making process for conceiving and implementing a PSPO;
ii) How the introduction of a PSPO impacts on the amount of ASB in that area;
iii) How PSPOs affect the perpetrators of ASB, in terms of the sanctions they receive and whether their ASB ceases or displaces; iv) Whether some local councils make greater/lesser use of PSPOs and why; and v) The effect of differing policy responses to ASB in relation to public attitudes and tolerance levels.
In sum, PSPO powers do not appear to be the mechanism to solve behavioural tensions in public spaces, as simply banning certain behaviours is likely to displace the problem and counteract efforts to integrate marginalised groups into mainstream society (Beckett and Herbert, 2009) . The introduction of these powers has promulgated a new era in behavioural regulation in England and Wales, without increasing the opportunities for community
